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OLIVIERO FRATTOLILLO 
Japan’s ODA Historical Path: From Top Donorship to the Decline   
Abstract: Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the U.S. 
and all other major industrialized countries, except Japan, have sharply increased ODA (Official 
Development Assistance) in hopes of reducing poverty in developing countries, which they see as a main 
factor inflaming Islamic fundamentalism and therefore as the hotbed of terrorism. This is a far cry from 
the 1990s when all major aid donors but Japan were suffering from ‘aid fatigue’ in the wake of the Cold 
War and either cut back on or failed to significantly increase aid. After attending the International 
Conference of Asian Political Parties in Southwest China’s Kunming City (July 17, 2010), Japan has 
indicated it wants to exit from the system of aiding poor countries. The move comes at a time of 
weakening U.S. economy, and China’s drive to enlarge its role in the arena of aid politics in both Africa 
and Asia. This paper attempts to explore how is changing Japan’s role within the international aid system 
from a historical perspective aimed to highlight the domestic and structural factors that led to the rise 
and fall of the country as aid-donor. Particular attention has been paid to the gaiatsu (external pressure) 
exerted during the Cold War years by the U.S. on the Japanese decision-making process as part of the 
reassessment of its geopolitical priorities.  
Keywords: Japan; Foreign Aid Politics; International History; Cold War; New Millennium.  
 
Introduction 
The dominant position in the studies dealing with the recent supposed Japan’s 
disengagement in foreign aid policy has often neglected a critically important dimension 
in the analysis of this phenomenon, even from a historical perspective. Japan’s ODA 
(Official Development Assistance) politics has been commonly considered as a mere 
and instrumental emanation of the national interest which merged the specific needs of 
the country’s private sector. Since the 1960s, in fact, Japanese overseas assistance has 
been inscribed into a sort of mercantilist logic, but what is not problematized is the 
weight exerted by specific factors, which are essentially political, both at domestic and 
at international level. In the first case, the image that has been often constructed did not 
take into account its interpretation in the Japanese context (constrained by the limits 
imposed by the Yoshida Doctrine), or – in the words of Carol Gluck – without 
“bringing the outside in”. In the second case, instead, it must be argued that the external 
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world has exerted a strong influence on Japan’s domestic history, namely in a country 
that once belonged to a pre-existing international order (the Sinocentric system) which 
was very far from the peculiarities of the Westphalian system. This can be faced in the 
framework of Japan’s history and its political structure, in addition to external structural 
factors. A number of themes and dimensions – historical, economic, and strategic – are 
involved  in its foreign aid politics. Furthermore, the role of the U.S., and more 
specifically, the evolving Japan-American postwar relations have conditioned and 
encouraged Japan to seek a circumscribed, low-profile approach to foreign politics. To 
make sense of this, it is necessary to employ a deductive analytical framework which 
take into consideration the wider and deeper political trends occurring in Japan, and that 
has clearly conditioned its engagement with the West. Inoguchi Takashi has proposed 
Japan’s historical models or perceptions as “free rider” (in economic and security terms), 
“challenger” (in trade terms), and as “supporter” (of international economic and 
political structures).
1
 It is the coexistence of these models that represented an enigma to 
the Western world. This inconvenient apposition continued almost during the entire 
Cold War era, although the image of Japan as a supportive member – even if 
competitive – of the international community was becoming upward.      
     This paper describes the rise and decline of Japan as aid donor country from the 
1960s onwards, highlighting the relevance of ODA both as an instrument of economic 
hegemony and as a tool of soft diplomacy. In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, and even more after 11/9, despite an initial increase of aid funds, Japanese 
overseas assistance suffered a sharp setback caused mainly by the international 
economic downturn. This phenomenon, knew within the Japanese circles as enjo 
tsukare (“aid fatigue”), is going to erode Japan’s international clout, since ODA has long 
been among the country’s most effective foreign policy tool. Moreover, this appears 
also affecting regional geopolitical equilibriums which are involving directly China.   
                                                 
1
 See I. TAKASHI, Tinkering Every 15 Years: A New Major Turn in Japan’s Foreign Policy?, in  «Japan 
Spotlight: Economic, Culture & History», 23, 2004, pp. 38-39.  
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      What is questioned here is how Japan’s role within the international aid system is 
effectively shifting, in the light of the global changes before and after 9/11, and even 
more following the recent economic downturn. Attention has been paid on the gaiatsu 
(“external pressure”) exerted by the U.S. on the Japanese decision-making process as 
part of the reassessment of its geopolitical priorities. During the Cold War years, the 
bipolarism acted as the systemic variable (the “independent variable”) which resulted in 
the Japanese ODA response (the “dependent variable”). In the pure realist anarchy, 
especially related to the first bipolar phase, Japan’s foreign aid politics was, in fact, the 
expression of a bilateralism within which high politics issues were gradually 
supplanting those of low politics. The economism of the Yoshida Doctrine inevitably 
affected the quality of Japanese overseas assistance, which has often been sacrificed on 
behalf of the overcoming of structural issues. In a long-term perspective, 
notwithstanding, Japan successfully managed a series of questions concerning its 
relations with the outside world, thanks to its low-profile approach and due to its 
pragmatic nationalism - a combination of ethical relativism and cultural particularism, 
which is a distinctive feature of Japanese foreign policy. It prevented Tokyo to rely on a 
set of fixed principles, inducing it to pursue national interests case by case, conforming 
to the international conditions of the moment.  
     Mainstream international relations theory fails to fully explain Japan’s posture 
toward Europe during the Cold War era and after. The discussion arises with particular 
reference to the neo-realist paradigm, since the neo-liberal model is theoretically more 
flexible, and therefore less binding. The issue of change or transformation within the 
international system can be considered the most critical front in the analysis performed 
on Waltz’s structural realism.2 A problem that is reflected by analogy on Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism: the inability to explain systemic changes and the power distribution 
issue.
3
 As it is inherent in Emile Durkheim’s “dynamic density”, the internal 
relationships with all types of societies become more and more complex and difficult to 
                                                 
2
 See K.N. WALTZ, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2001. 
3
 See J.J. MEARSHEIMER, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, Norton & Company, 2003.  
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manage but, most of all, constantly changing.
4
 In addition, as the systemic changes take 
place from single units, neo-realism could not be able to explain them. This approach 
reminds us to Robert Keohane’s idea, according to which neo-realism is particularly 
weak in predicting change, especially in those cases where this is determined by 
domestic and economic factors that the theory excludes aprioristically.
5
 
     In the Japanese case, the weakness emphasized by a number of authors about the 
contribution of neo-realism is particularly well suited to the country’s specificities and 
its conduct in foreign policy – not being Japan, moreover, an actor who can put on the 
top of its international agenda hard politics issues. While, obviously, times may have 
existed in history in which the country pursued its own “national interest” – defined by 
Peter Katzenstein as the result of  «regulatory and constitutive norms»
6
 – even in the 
dynamics that have characterized its relations with Europe, Japan may be mainly an 
actor that followed a mercantilist approach. From the neo-liberal perspective, instead, 
many aspects probably suggest that Japan’s ODA performance can be easily inscribed 
within a process of “complex interdependence”, as defined by Keohane and Joseph Nye, 
at least since the early 1970s.
7
 
 
1. The “Golden Sixties” and the kaihatsu-yunyū strategy  
 
By the early 1960s, some of the countries that had recently reached their independence 
from the colonial powers began to press on the United Nations (UN), together with the 
non-aligned countries, so that it could extend its activities to the promotion of 
development among the poor countries, while ensuring international economic equity. 
This position was formally expressed in 1960 UN General Assembly, where it was 
formally requested more assistance to Developing Countries (DCs) from the rich world. 
                                                 
4
 See A. GIDDENS, ed., E. Durkheim: Selected Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 
150.   
5
 See R.O. KEOHANE, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in R.O. KEOHANE, ed., 
Neorealism and Its Critics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 158-203.  
6
 P.J. KATZENSTEIN, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, New 
York, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 19. 
7
 See R.O. KEOHANE - J.S. NYE, Power and Interdependence, Canada, Pearson Education, 2011. 
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The success of the 1959 Communist revolution in Cuba, the ongoing crisis in the 
Belgian Congo and the inauguration of an international aid politics by Communist 
China helped to increase the Western awareness on the strategic relevance of the 
international assistance. In 1961, following the inauguration of the program known as a 
“Decade for Development” (destined to become the “First Decade”), the industrialized 
countries were invited to devote 1% of their GDP to Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), in the forms of grant aid, soft loans and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
     At the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I) held 
in Geneva in 1964, and which was attended by seventy-seven DCs (“The Group of 77”), 
Japan participated as a member of the “rich countries” (Group B). Having now reached 
the status of industrially advanced country, it assumed on this occasion its first official 
engagement in the context of ODA, pledging to programmatically devote to foreign aid 
resources equivalent to 1% of the GDP. The Pearson Report, commissioned by the 
World Bank (WB) and published in 1969 by an international team led by Canadian 
Prime Minister Lester Pearson, was probably the strategy paper that best represented the 
political spirit characterizing the “Decade for Development” . The report indicated the 
need for the advanced countries to achieve the goal of allocating 1% of GNP (of which a 
minimum rate of 0.7% in the form of ODA) to the South of the world by 1975.  
     The delicate fiscal and monetary problems that the U.S. faced during the 1960s, led 
Washington to shift part of the burden concerning the financial aids to the other 
members of the “club of rich countries”. The extraordinary economic growth that Japan 
was experiencing at that time did not permit it to escape from this commitment.
8
 
Moreover, the imbalances of the U.S. economy made it necessary urgent adjustment 
measures among Japan-American relations. Washington pressed Tokyo in order to 
abandon its attitude toward the Ajia no hi-seijika (“de-politicization of Asia”) and to do 
more in supporting anti-Communist forces in its own geopolitical area. Thus Japan 
started up a policy of intense aid flows destined to countries like Taiwan, South Korea 
and Indonesia, and during the meeting between Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and 
                                                 
8
 See H. SUKEHIRO, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice, New York, Praeger, 1975, pp. 12-13. 
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President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 «recognized that the elevation of living standards 
and the advancement of social welfare are essential for the political stability of 
developing nations throughout the world and agreed to strengthen their economic 
cooperation with such countries».
9
  
     With its accession to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 1964 as official member of the Development Aid Committee (DAC), Japan 
was subjected to a sort of gaiatsu (“external pressure”), in order for it to abide by the 
standards of the donor countries’ community. Compared to the period 1961-1964, in 
fact, in the years between 1965 and 1970 the average of Japanese ODA increased 
threefold – from a total of US $112 million to US $361 million on a yearly basis – even 
surpassing the assistance levels of France, UK, Germany, and becoming second only to 
the U.S.
10
 
     In 1966 Japan began to provide loans for commodities aimed to help countries in 
crisis with their balance of payments, through loans in yen that would allow them to 
import basic goods without having to draw down its financial reserves. Three years later, 
the Japan Overseas Volunteer Corps (JOVC) started promoting an impressive assistance 
program for technical projects. To meet the American requests, moreover, Japan 
intensified its assistance to some Asian countries that had priority from a strategic 
perspective. Only seven of the thirty projects based on grant aid, covering the period 
1969-1973, were addressed to countries other than Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and 
Thailand.
11
 Another effect of the gaiatsu exerted on Japan was highlighted by the active 
role the country played in certain programs of regional cooperation, such as the 
establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1965, the organization since 
1966 of an annual Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast 
Asia in Tokyo, and its growing contribution to the implementation of projects designed 
within the Mekong Committee.  
                                                 
9 Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister and U.S. President Johnson, Washington, January 13, 1965: 
http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19650113.D1E.html (last access: 4/12/2018).  
10
 See OECD, Development Assistance Review, Paris, OECD, 1971, pp. 199-200. 
11
 See ibid. 
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     Japan’s politico-strategic reorientation for the second half of the 1960s, also 
produced permanent changes in the geographical distribution of aid. Between l961 and 
1964, in fact, the country signed nine agreements on soft loans, eight of which were 
destined to the Southeast Asian countries. Between 1965 and 1970, the number of 
similar projects was increased to fifty-two, but it was accompanied by a significant 
change in geographical distribution. Countries like Iran, Chile, Argentina, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria were among the new recipients of the Japanese ODA.  
     Some problems, however, persisted. Between 1950 and 1972, Japan’s fast economic 
growth, based on the development of the heavy industry, and the increasing level of 
national exports, were causing a certain intolerance in most trading partners, especially 
in Asia. In the early 1970s, in East and Southeast Asian non-Communist countries 
Japanese goods were flooding the stores. The South Koreans feared that the foreign 
money could spread corruption in their country and that Japanese imperialism could 
take the place of the old colonial rule. The Thai student associations organized boycott 
actions against goods imported from Tokyo, while the Indonesians protested against the 
exploitation of their forests and other natural resources by unscrupulous foreign 
businessmen.  
     The Japanese financial support was becoming of paramount importance for the 
countries of this area, but there was also a common feeling that Tokyo was offering less 
favorable terms than other advanced countries, and that its assistance was aimed 
exclusively to favor the interests of the Japanese private sector. The dimensions of the 
problem became alarmingly clear in January 1974, when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei 
went to visit several countries in Southeast Asia, causing widespread protests and 
disturbances. The demonstrations turned against the “economic imperialism” of Tokyo, 
but the discontent was also fueled by the ostentation of  «Japanese abrasive manner and 
style of behavior».
12
 On the other hand, Japan’s dependence on a number of countries in 
importing oil and mineral products was significantly enhanced along with serious 
deterioration of its environmental conditions caused by the rapid process of national 
                                                 
12
 L.D. HAYES, Introduction to Japanese Politics, New York & London, M.E. Sharpe, 2005, p. 230. 
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industrialization. This implied a renewal of the national policy guidelines: reshaping the 
country’s foreign aid policy, while coping with the gaiatsu, would have also allowed to 
solve problems like these. The strategy of kaihatsu-yūnyū (“Development-cum-Import”) 
was thus aiming at ensuring adequate raw materials to the country, combating 
environmental pollution and reducing excessive internal imbalances in international 
trade that were damaging Japan’s partners. Most of the cooperation projects were 
conceived according to these three purposes, even if priority continued to be given to 
those programs which favored the procurement of raw materials and energy sources. 
This was particularly evident in the loans accorded by the Export-Import Bank of Japan 
(EIB), and it is not without significance that the main projects carried out within the 
kaihatsu yūnyū strategy were aimed at importing uranium and oil.  
     The peace agreements signed between 1954 and 1959 already allowed Tokyo to 
build a fairly extensive trade relations with most countries of the region, but this process 
was fully accomplished only in these years. This neo-mercantilist approach was the 
result of a precise national strategy, whose goal was not the achievement of political and 
military power, but reaching economic development (the economy’s primacy over 
politics).
13
 While the U.S., entangled in Vietnam, were working hard in order to 
encourage the creation in the anti-Communist countries - such as Singapore, Malaysia 
and Thailand - of a broad united front, Japan sought to create benevolent conditions for 
its own economic interests.
14
 Moreover, the economic policy promoted during the 1960s 
produced impressive results, and Japan «was already the fifth-largest economy in the 
world».
15
 In the same period, the DAC urged donor countries to increase their ODA 
commitments, and to support projects which had to be untied from any kind of 
conditionality. Japan was facing a dilemma: the sense in which Western standards 
defined the overseas assistance was incompatible with the orientation the country 
followed until then. Thus in 1969, in order to redefine the functions of the Japanese 
                                                 
13
 See F. MAZZEI - V. VOLPI, Asia al Centro, Milano, Università Bocconi Editore, 2006, p. 91. 
14
 See M. YAHUDA, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 195.  
15
 A. LYMAN MILLER - R. WICH, Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations 
Since World War II, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 63. 
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economic cooperation, it was decided to establish a Taigai Keizai Kyōryoku Shingikai 
(“Council for International Economic Cooperation”), which was then headed by Okita 
Saburō, the former President of the Japan Economic Research Centre.  
 
2. Merging mercantile realism and aid diplomacy (the 1970s) 
 
The proceedings of the Shingikai were opened in March 1970 by the Premier Satō 
Eisaku, and was aimed at obtaining technical advices on the most effective strategies to 
be adopted in order to promote economic cooperation according to the country’s fast 
rise, both economically and diplomatically. Indeed, if the domestic policy focused on 
the maintenance of peace and prosperity, Japan’s international political agenda was 
characterized by the adoption of an “omnidirectional diplomacy” (zenhōi gaikō), 
looking for a “friendly approach” with all countries. 16  Satō faced with a new 
international scenario. The world order was no longer merely a reflection of a flexible 
bipolarism. The emergence of new conflicts, not necessarily global but linked to local 
antagonisms, produced by ideological issues and imbalances in regional arrangements, 
determined new strategic scenarios. A process of multipolarization that, although it was 
still under development, suggested that the stability of the international system could no 
longer depend solely on the peaceful coexistence of the two blocks.
17
 Satō was aware 
that the emergence of this first form, more and more pervasive, of economic 
interdependence was inaugurating a real “age of internationalization” (kokusaika 
jidai).
18
 And, as was happening for several other countries, Japan was beginning to 
suffer the effects of exogenous factors. In the late 1960s, a number of events produced 
profound changes in the international framework. Need only to recall the link between 
the Prague Spring and the wave of global youth protest: for the first time, on that 
occasion, the interiorization of the Cold War system emerged in the minds of various 
cultures and peoples. It was probably the symptom of a deeper change that resulted 
                                                 
16
 See B. EDSTRÖM, Japan’s Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa, London, 
MacMillan Press, 1999, pp. 57-70. 
17
 See S. EISAKU, Satō Eisaku Nikki, vol.1, Tokyo, Asahi shibunsha, 1999. 
18
 I. MAKOTO, Sengo Nihon Gaikō-shi, Tokyo, Yūhikaku, 2010, p. 110. 
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from an unexpected economic development that made it harder for the states the control 
on the societies. The linear phase of hegemonic control exerted by the two superpowers 
could probably be considered concluded.
19
  
     The 1973 oil crisis forced Japan to strengthen its access roads to oil and its 
derivatives. To do this, Tokyo adopted two strategies, different but complementary. On 
the one hand, it increased its ODA towards the countries holding energy reserves (in this 
context particular attention was paid to the Near and Middle East). On the other hand, it 
abandoned the markedly pro-Israel position followed in the past and began to support 
the Arab cause, recognizing the PLO as the Palestinian representative body and 
organizing an important diplomatic mission in the Middle East and North Africa to 
improve its image and its market.
20
 This reorientation of foreign policy was the 
synthesis between its traditional strategic pragmatism and the recent tendency to 
achieve greater independence from the U.S.
21
  
     The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, which took place during 
the Iran revolution, ended the period of detente, inaugurating a new and more 
complicated phase of the Cold War. As was clearly demonstrated by the promulgation 
of the “Fukuda Doctrine”, Japan was the first government to understand that military 
power was becoming increasingly irrelevant in an increasingly interdependent world. In 
those years, Japanese policy-makers formulated a more detailed conceptions of the role 
of economic power within security policy. The notion of Comprehensive National 
Security Policy (Sōgō anzen hoshō), emerged during the Ōhira administration (1978-80), 
was officially adopted under his successor Suzuki Zenkō.22 
     Though the same Ōhira stated that Japan should support the U.S. efforts in 
containing the threat posed to international security and argued that the world was still 
divided into opposing camps (jin’ei), this does not meant that the fidelity of Japan to the 
                                                 
19
 See A. MARWICK, The Sixties: The Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy and the United States, 
1958-1974, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998. 
20
 See J. MORIKAWA, Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy, London, Hurst&Company, 1996, p. 
69. 
21
 See K. NORIO, Tanaka Kakuei Tei Shosei Nikki, Tokyo, Nikkei BP kikaku, 2002, pp. 70-72. 
22
 See I. MASARU, Nihon Ga Ikōshi Gaisetsu, Tokyo, Keio University, 1997. 
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U.S. would preclude a different point of view between the two countries if security 
issues had concerned either economic or otherwise. The Nixon shock and the American 
defeat in Vietnam had, however, demonstrated that the guarantees offered by the 
alliance with Washington were not absolute. The oil crises, on the other hand, had 
highlighted the danger of the country’s dependence from international economy, against 
which the U.S. hard power could not do anything.  
     According to Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, «Japan’s definition and practical 
implementation reflect the country’s historical and normative background as well as its 
post-World War II preference for non-military and human-centred foreign policy».
23
 In 
Japan’s foreign policy the boundaries between the concepts of comprehensive security 
and human security are blurred. If the two terms are often considered interchangeable, 
some scholars have thought it would be more useful to apply the first to the starting 
stage in which Tokyo ushered this approach, while the second could be used with 
reference to Japan – as to many other countries – about its tendency to focus on the 
importance of the individual rather than of the State. Although these differences have 
often more theoretical than practical value, they converge into a single, multi-
dimensional concept of security, which can be interpreted differently depending on the 
weight given to the third or second level of analysis (the individual or the State). 
Ultimately, as Amitav Acharya commented, the approach to the security of a State self-
positing the “individual level” if it relates to the personal dimension (that is “human 
security”), and is placed on the “level of statehood” if it relates to the national (that is 
“comprehensive security”).24 While it is therefore possible to distinguish the kind of 
threat (physical violence – physical violence and non-military) and leave out the 
problem of related unit in question (individual/State), human security and 
comprehensive security meet the same conceptual path, since both concern threats to the 
security arrangements in a non-traditional way.  
                                                 
23
 E. ATANASSOVA-CORNELIS, Japan and the ‘Human Security’ Debate: History, Norms and Pro-Active 
Foreign Policy, in «Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies», III, 2, 2005, p. 58.  
24
 See A. ACHARYA, Human Security: East Versus West?, Singapore, Nanyang Technological University 
Library, 2001, p. 14. 
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     Many of the human security basic issues gained greater significance after the end of 
the Cold War and the concept has emerged in relation to the ways to respond to the 
main challenges, such as forgotten ethnic conflict, civil wars, the spread of problems 
related to the process of globalization, the widening of the North-South economic gap, 
the growing attention to the theme of human rights on a global scale The notion of 
human security found its theoretical organization in 1990, under the first UNDP Human 
Development Report.
25
 Here it is defined, first, in terms of protection from embedded 
threats as hunger, disease and repression in general. It has already gone beyond the aim 
of securing the basic needs for security or survival of individuals, incorporating an 
overview of the total development of the human being and his dignity. Undeniable, on 
the other hand, the benefits that Japan has achieved embracing this approach to security. 
It is well known, in fact, that thanks to the protection provided by the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, Japan has been able to focus exclusively on its own economic recovery and 
development, without any need to allocate resources to a large-scale military buildup. 
Paradoxically, Tokyo’s reluctance to establish a fully independent security agenda 
allowed the Japanese decision-makers to avoid any kind of military action by allowing 
the country, at the same time, to consolidate its economic growth and pursuing a 
comprehensive security that would contained within itself the defense, economic and 
social dimensions.
26
  
     The perspective in which Japan’s security was framed went therefore beyond the 
mere military dimension, and this must be made clear as the low priority given to 
military security, rather than a comprehensive security policy, was based on the non-
acceptance of the use of force as a legitimate means of dispute resolution and 
commitment to not possess any arsenal. This has resulted, in part, the reactive posture of 
Japan on the international stage from the standpoint of military security, basically 
throughout the Cold War. This situation contrasts sharply with the unstoppable Japanese 
                                                 
25
 See UNDP, Human Development Report 1990, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 
26
 See M. MOCHIZUKI, Japan’s Changing International Role, in TH. BERGER et al., eds., Japan in 
International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2007, pp. 
1-22. 
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growth in the 1970s and 1980s, but also with the development in other directions – 
other than strictly military – of its contribution to the maintenance of international 
security, as increasingly emerged during the second phase of the Cold War, but also for 
the subsequent Gulf War in 1990. On that occasion, Tokyo offered its contribution by 
providing US $ 13 billion ODA and denied military assistance. This approach to security, 
that can be called of soft type, has been the object of criticism which highlighted the 
excessive withdrawal of Japan on the checkbook diplomacy.  
 
3. Japan’s aid leadership: from the endaka to the San Mi-Ittai cooperation (the 1980s) 
 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Japan became the world’s biggest donor. Its direct 
investment in Asia grew vertiginously, so as to exceed those of the U.S. In parallel, we 
witnessed a decline in relative terms of the American economic strength, which 
recorded severe trade and budget deficits. As a result, Washington increasingly 
intensified the pressures on the other advanced nations, in order to alert them in taking 
more responsibility: Japan, in particular, was sharply criticized for its lack of 
commitment at international level. However, as it is clear, the country could have not 
exercised an effective military weight in the management of world affairs, and has come 
to make use of ODA as political instrument in a perspective of burden-sharing.  
     The Plaza Agreement, signed on 22 September 1985, marked Japan’s political entry 
among the great powers, when the G5 (U.S., Japan, West Germany, France and Great 
Britain) met to solve the problem of trade imbalances of the Western economies and to 
contain the strong fluctuations in the exchange rates of their currencies. The Japanese 
cooperation would have certainly been essential in trying to control the decline of the 
dollar on currency markets. The economic policy measures that were decided herein, 
however, did not produce the desired effects, but those of wonderfully encouraging 
Japan’s presence in a global economy based on the dollar. The yen, in fact, grew by 
40% against the U.S. dollar within one year, and as a counter-measure to the endaka 
(“yen appreciation”), Tokyo decided to transfer most of the manufacturing processes 
overseas, in countries where economic and commercial transactions would have been 
Oliviero Frattolillo 
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accounted for directly in U.S. dollars. This allowed the Japanese business community to 
leave behind the high labor costs that the endaka would have produced in Japan and, at 
the same time, to largely promote its FDI.   
     The reaction of the West in the face of disproportionate benefits of which the 
Japanese economy was taking advantage was characterized by a certain adversity. Japan 
was confronted with the need to do something in order to strengthen its position within 
the Western alliance, and thus decided to shift its attention from trade surplus to an 
increase in its aid flows. The first significant change in the formulation of Japanese ODA 
policy were induced, soon after, by the great changes that took place on the 
international political scene at the end of the decade by the collapse of the USSR, which 
produced new policy responses also in terms of foreign aid policy. 
     The endaka impact on the Japanese economy gave rise to two specific phenomena. 
On the one hand, it created a surplus of capital within the country and, on the other, it 
involved a sharp rise in domestic costs of production. Japan had therefore an urgent 
need for specific policy strategies in order to successfully face the new international 
challenges. The first response in this regard was offered by a kind of Marshall Plan for 
Japanese aid (drafted in 1986 by a study group headed by Okita Saburō) under which 
Tokyo would have invested a total of US $ 125 billion in DCs by the end of the decade. 
Japan was becoming the largest global provider of capital and technology, by recycling 
its own trade surplus through FDI. This was the new line adopted by Japanese politicians 
in the aftermath of the Plaza Agreement, which resulted in 1988 in the two key concepts 
for the management of Japanese aid politics all along the 1990s: the San Mi-Ittai 
Cooperation (Three Cooperations in One) and the principle of the horizontal labor 
division in Asia. Within the San Mi-Ittai Cooperation – founded on the three pillars of 
ODA, FDI, and imports from DCs – the principle of horizontal division of labor in Asia 
became the direct consequence of the first. The wide range economic cooperation that 
Japan was creating in the Asian region, would have not only ensured Tokyo a 
substantial financial income, but it would have also served as outpost for the realization 
of a more charismatic leadership within the international community, especially from 
the diplomatic point of view. 
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     In 1989 Japan officially emerged as the world’s top donor country in absolute terms. 
The key role played by the country at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development held in Rio de Janeiro – and on other occasions afterwards – has 
undoubtedly led to a “change of guard” that made Japanese leadership in the foreign aid 
politics an important reality of international politics of that decade. The new political 
vision which was concurrently announced by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in April 
1991 defined the issues concerning the political, economic and social development of 
recipient countries that Japan should must take into consideration before granting any 
form of assistance: 1) trends in and levels of military expenditures; 2) trends in the 
acquisition of technology to produce nuclear weapons and/or weapons of mass 
destruction; 3) promotion of democratization and economic reforms based on the 
Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs); 4) protection of human rights. This new 
political approach presented many elements in contradiction with the philosophy of the 
aid policy that had preceded it in Japanese political circles. Supported by the MOFA, the 
policy promoted by Kaifu was modeled, among other, on the priorities of those 
politicians of the Ministry eager to see Japan get into step with other Western countries 
in the process of promoting democracy and human rights. In this context, there were 
also taken into account the requests of the Ministry of Trade and International Industry 
(MITI) which pressed the Government as to provide assistance even to Socialist 
countries, in order to secure new business opportunities for the Japanese private 
sector.
27
 
 
4. The post-bipolar paradigm and the New Miyazawa Initiative (the 1990s) 
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, we witnessed to the end of the ideological 
metanarrative on which was built the entire Cold War historical discourse, as well as to 
the dissolution of the infamous dichotomy “friend-enemy” within the borders of the 
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precise East-West scheme, and to the decline of the American hegemony that – in 
Kupchan’s eyes – «lost its compass».28  
     Along with the new commitments undertaken by increasing the amount of aid 
provided and of capitals invested in a large number of DCs since the early 1990s, Japan 
experienced a significant renewal in the management of ODA programs, such as the 
improving of the projects implementation and the identification of the objectives to be 
pursued. In 1990 it was, in fact, created the Gyōkakushin (“Provisional Council for the 
Promotion of Administrative Reform”) aimed at studying practical ways to enhance 
both the quality of life of the Japanese and the international relations of the country. In 
its first official report issued in July 1991, the Gyōkakushin claimed the need to renew 
the principles underlying the ODA political management in order to more effectively 
coordinate the work of the various national agencies. But the most important news that 
emerged in this report, were the direct result of the crisis in the Persian Gulf and 
described ODA as a strategic tool of foreign policy which is able to impact positively on 
the military expenditures trends of the recipient countries and to promote democracy. 
As a matter of fact, the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis, for which Japan was asked to shell out 
large sums of money in lieu of a direct military participation, led the Gyōkakushin to 
invoke the urgent adoption of a charter stating the new framework and operational 
guidelines for ODA management. The report was forwarded to Prime Minister 
Miyazawa Kiichi and its principles were officially adopted as part of the Seihu Kaihatsu 
Enjo Taikō (“ODA Charter”), which was enacted on 30 June 1992. 
     In 1993 the WB published a study on the “miracle” of economic development in East 
Asia entitled East Asian Miracle,
29
 where it was highlighted the efficacy of growth 
mainly based on savings rates, the general level of education, the promotion of industry, 
the adoption of new advanced technologies, and macroeconomic stability. The WB 
emphasized, moreover, the successful cooperation between the public and private, and 
the creation of the new economic wealth which seemed far more satisfactory than 
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elsewhere. The success achieved in the economic development of some Asian countries, 
through specific strategies promoted and emphasized by the same WB, was therefore 
indisputable. This study was to convince people that what happened was “phenomenal” 
and therefore had to be a model for the rest of the developing world, regardless of 
latitude or distinct social, political and cultural contexts. A few years later, the main 
reasons cited by the WB to explain the eruption of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
limited to a current account deficit fueled by bank loans, the so-called “under-
capitalization” of private companies that base their activities on short-term bank loans, 
as well as to a markets’ liberalization not properly supported by the appropriate 
regulatory institutions. To overcome the crisis, in short, the WB recommended new 
capital transfers in order to stimulate the growth of these countries without, nevertheless, 
be able to hide the fact that one of the main lessons of this crisis was the fragility of 
progress in several Asian countries, dramatically putting into question the issue of 
development based on the mechanisms of economic liberalization. But an ominous 
shadow of the Asian crisis, which has made its effects felt in all the strongest world 
economies, was represented by the sharp decrease recorded since 1995 in ODA flows, in 
particular from Japan, where funds were cut 10,4% in 1998. Nevertheless, in October 
1998 the Japanese Government announced the New Miyazawa Initiative: a new plan of 
international assistance able to deal well with the crisis. Within this Initiative new funds 
were allocated to ODA, for a total amount of US $30 billion, aimed at providing forms 
of financial assistance. Such programs were directed only to countries such as Thailand, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea. The approach adopted by the 
MOFA on the limited geographical focus of this initiative has been significantly affected 
by budget cuts imposed on ODA by the Ministry of Finance for the following years. 
Consequently, the Ministry decided not to provide assistance indiscriminately, but 
favoring some regions and cutting aid to others. The “multilateralization” of Japan’s 
security policy has probably found its quintessence in the notion of “human security” 
and in the manner in which it has been applied.
30
 The first reference to the safety of the 
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individuals appeared when the prime minister Murayama Tomiichi turned to the United 
Nations General Assembly as part of the Copenhagen World Summit for Social 
Development in 1995, speaking of “human-centered” social development as a central 
element of the Japanese ODA policies. His vision was considered part of the Japanese 
approach to the multilateralism.
31
 In 1997, his successor Hashimoto Ryutarō, addressing 
to the UN General Assembly, referred to the “human security” citing the principles 
underlying the debates which took place within international agencies like the OECD, 
the DAC and the United Nations Development Programme (UNPD), as the «respect for 
human rights of every citizen» and the «protection from poverty, disease, ignorance, 
oppression and violence».
32
 The 1997 Asian financial crisis became for Tokyo a strong 
incentive in order to promote human security initiatives. In March 1999, Japan and the 
UN Secretariat launched the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS). 
Beyond the establishment of the Fund, the Japanese Government organized several 
forums and conferences focused especially on issues such as development and health.
33
 
Notwithstanding, since 2001 the actors involved in the Fund started to seriously take 
into consideration the possibility of combating terrorism through the development of 
human security. The institution of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), an 
independent organism established by Japan and co-chaired by the former UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and by the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, was 
probably the most immediate expression of this new orientation.
34
 The efforts of the 
CHS were in part marginalized by a strong change in the global security landscape, 
characterized by China’s rise, the North Koreans nuclear ambitions, the U.S. war on 
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terror, and by the following realignment of Japan alongside the White House’s military 
campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, and then in Iraq in late 2003.  
 
5. The emergence of “aid fatigue” in the 9/11 aftermath  
 
Between the end of the old and the beginning of the new millennium, the Japanese 
foreign aid policy has gone through a new phase of transformation in response to 
changes in both domestic and international political scene. On the one hand, Japan 
experienced the so-called enjo tsukare, a phenomenon known in the West as “aid 
fatigue”, that is a gradual curtailment of aid flows, partly due to the need to rein in 
public expenditures, and partly to the absence of popular support for overseas assistance 
programs. On the other hand, the upheavals caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks have 
also affected Japan’s international position, as well as its foreign aid policy. 
     After a new phase of growth in Japanese ODA flows between 1998 and 2000, which 
was determined by the assistance provided to the countries struck by the Asian financial 
crisis, the MOFA presented for the FY2002 a request for ODA budget less than 10% 
compared to the previous year. From that year on, Japanese aid flows experienced a 
gradual decline: US $9.847 million in 2001, 9.283 in 2002, 8.880 in 2003. The trend 
persists, having reached the peak of 6.823 in 2008 and of 6.167 in 2009, while showing 
by allocating US $7.331 million in 2010 a slight, but occasional, upward.
35
 
     In 2001 Japan has given way to the U.S. as the largest bilateral donor, a position it 
held for a decade. The loss of the status of top donor country was an emblematic event, 
since in Japanese’s eyes the foreign aid was the expression of the country’s global 
economic power. In 2002 the percentage related to Japan’s commitments in the total 
DAC bilateral aid has dropped to 16%. For the same year Japan’s ODA/GDP ratio was 
recorded at 0.23%, ranking fifth among the member countries of the Committee. At the 
2002 International Conference on Financing for Development, which took place in 
Monterrey, Japan was one of the few members of the DAC that did not pledged to 
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maintain, or to increase, the funds allocated to foreign assistance, both in absolute and 
in ODA/GDP terms. This trend continued throughout the decade, ODA/GDP ratio has 
settled into a range between 0.18% (2009) and 0.20% (2010).
 36
 In 2011 Japan has 
become fifth among DAC member countries, with respect to the net bilateral 
disbursements (US $ 6.774 as 3-year average, on 2008-2010 basis).
37
The budget cuts are 
due primarily to the protracted economic stagnation in Japan and to the gradual growth 
of public debt levels. In fact, due to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies adopted 
by the Japanese Government during the 1990s in order to cope with the recession, the 
total cumulative debt of the country reached in 2000 over 140% of GDP. In a situation 
where the country needed to take urgent measures to reduce the fiscal deficit, cutting 
back the ODA commitments was undoubtedly far less unpopular than reducing public 
expenditures. In fact, while other budget items were supported by the private sector and 
politicians, this time the business community did not support the allocation of funds to 
overseas assistance, due both to the policy of untied aid pursued by the MOFA from the 
second half of the 1990s, and to politicians for which the ODA policy was not a 
votecatcher.
38
 The second factor that led to the phenomenon of enjo tsukare is the 
changed attitude of Japanese public opinion about the foreign aid. Since the creation of 
Japan’s international cooperation program, the audience was quite in favor of increasing 
ODA levels. This kind of support, as stressed above, has made possible a continued 
increase in aid funds since the 1970s. Now, because of economic and fiscal problems of 
the country, the public support has been gradually diminishing. Although in 2001 there 
was a slight increase in support for ODA, as the immediate effect of 11/9, it was not 
confirmed from 2002 onwards. To address the problem of enjo tsukare the MOFA 
initiated, on one side, a process of reform of the Japanese ODA and, on the other, it 
widely emphasized the improvement of the aid quality. The reform of the aid system 
was conducted seeking to introduce greater transparency, effectiveness and 
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accountability, in order to regain the confidence of Japanese taxpayers. Since 1999, 
several reforms have been concerned the administrative apparatus responsible for 
managing overseas assistance programs. However, the main innovation to be mentioned 
is the revision of the Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo Taikō, published in August 2003. In order to 
ensure that the new Charter was aligned with the expectations of the public, over eight 
meetings were held in the presence of journalists, researchers, representatives of the 
business community, and NGO staff. From the perspective of the efficiency, the new 
document devotes an entire section to the policy formulation and aid projects 
implementation, in which, among other things, the Government undertook appropriate 
measures to prevent corruption and fraudulent use of ODA. As regards, however, the 
effectiveness, the new Charter explicitly links the policy of international assistance to 
the national interest, but never use this expression explicitly. Firstly, the document sets 
out among the priority objectives of Japan’s ODA «to contribute to the peace and 
development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own 
security and prosperity».
39
 But more importantly, considering the successive ODA cuts, 
beyond the implementation of a general reform of the aid system, the Japanese 
Government focused its efforts on improving the “quality” of aid as to compensate for 
its reduced “quantity”. The MOFA therefore redirected the funds towards human-
centered projects with a particular focus on the social sector and the environment. The 
so-called “soft aid”, which focuses primarily on the Basic Human Needs, such as the 
alleviation of poverty, the strengthening of gender policy and the sustainable 
development, became the new instrument to be favored. The main advantage is that this 
type of aid projects requires funds less soft than the traditional ones (such as large 
infrastructure projects), and ensures a positive feedback from the public opinion in the 
country. 
     The 9/11 terrorist attacks, which were followed by the “war on terror” against the 
Taliban Government in Kabul and the “preventive war” against the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, have not directly involved East Asia, but they have, in some way, altered the 
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region’s geostrategic landscape, affecting the trans-Pacific relations.40  With specific 
regard to Japan, the war against the Taliban offered the country the chance to move 
closer to a “normalization” of its foreign policy. In fact, Japan is considered by many 
analysts as abnormal from the point of view of its international behavior, because of its 
tendency to adopt a “reactive” position in relating to events and changes in the structure 
of the International System . In other words, Japan’s conduct in the international arena 
would be sharply determined by the gaiatsu, and more specifically by the beiatsu 
(“American pressure”). The country reacted to the dramatic events of 9/11 with a 
readiness in many ways surprising. Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō immediately 
announced that the country would have provided military support to the U.S. 
intervention in Afghanistan, and by the end of the same year, the Diet passed a law that, 
broadly interpreting the article 9 of the Constitution, allowed for the first time in the 
postwar era, the active participation of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in military 
operations conducted without the UN endorsement. It was an historic decision, and 
taken individually, with which Japan tried reducing its dependence on U.S. foreign 
policy and security. This decision seemed to have led Japan on the path of 
“normalization” at least for two reasons: it lessened the constitutional restrictions and 
stripped the neighboring Asian countries, especially China, of the possibility of 
complaining by following instrumental purposes for a revival of Japanese militarism, as 
this was now being used to serve the noble cause of fighting international 
terrorism.However, the steps made towards the “normalization” of Japan as an 
autonomous international actor were subsequently canceled, or at least restrained, 
during the war launched by President George W. Bush on Iraq. In fact, this time, the 
participation of SDF in the operations of the coalition led by Washington was, in a 
sense, an obvious choice for Koizumi Cabinet, due to a sort of strategic-diplomatic 
entrapment in which Japan has found itself, mainly because of the strategy of 
brinkmanship pursued by North Korea, based on the nuclear blackmail. 
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     Moreover, although many analysts consider almost inevitable the gradual 
militarization of Japan, at the same time they considers highly unlikely that the country 
would become a U.S. military ally in all respects. The increased military role of Japan 
must be evaluated in the context of the “special relationship” that bound the country to 
the U.S. in the postwar years. Ultimately, as a result of Japan’s “forced” participation to 
the war in Iraq, the asymmetric character of this relationship has been renewed. 
Although today it is more correct to refer at it as a relationship of interdependence 
rather than dependence, it remains still fully asymmetric, since its disruption, or even its 
simple deterioration, would cost to Tokyo far more than for Washington. This situation 
results in a sense of vulnerability on the part of Japan, which leads him to yield to U.S. 
pressure by altering its course of action even when it seems to affect its own interests. 
This modus operandi is also found in the Japanese ODA policy, so much so that Japan 
has often changed its conduct in order to face the pressures, whether implicit or explicit, 
of Washington. 
     Tokyo feels even more vulnerable now because of the change of U.S. strategy in the 
Far East, leading to 9/11 and subsequent events. In fact, the White House begun to 
move towards a closer relationship with China, giving credit to those students that look 
to overcome the “Japan-bashing” in favor of the “Japan-passing”, namely replace 
Beijing to Tokyo in the analysis of the major international players because of the 
perceived decline of Japan’s economic superpower status. The ultimate result has 
definitely been an improvement of the U.S.-Japan alliance, since neither Koizumi nor 
the leaders who preceded him and who tried to go beyond the institutional framework 
based on the Yoshida doctrine, have never seriously questioned it.
41
 Once again that has 
been considered the most suitable context within to operate a balance of power in the 
region that would bring Japan to play an even more active international role. Koizumi 
Government did not inaugurated any process aimed to alter the ideological and 
institutional structure of Japanese security politics, nor did it questioned the human 
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security theoretical foundations.
42
 This means that Japan did not reach a viable 
alternative to the Yoshida doctrine, but – as stressed by McCormack – Koizumi’s 
approach certainly encouraged a Japanese domestic environment more open and 
receptive towards issues converging more and more on a multilateral level in world 
forums.
43
 While acknowledging the vital importance of hard security matters, Japan 
increased the scope of its soft policies both regionally and globally. But even if Japan 
aims to increase its international role through the alliance with Washington, its approach 
to the security issues remains anchored to the principles of multilateralism.  
     However, Japan’s orientation towards the human security, as developed in the CHS 
was not abandoned, but converted through the official adoption of the human security 
doctrine by the UN General Secretariat, following the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. 
The success of  “multilateralization” of the Japanese human security enabled this 
doctrine not to be neutralized by Japan’s foreign policy agenda, which was seemingly 
evolving towards a hard dimension. Far from being contradictory, the two agendas may 
actually be complementary, as they increased the diversification of Japan’s foreign 
policy objectives and its international coalitions.
44
 The Japanese approach to the human 
security should be considered as a political tool aimed at managing security issues in a 
non-traditional way. It coincides with the birth of a new pro-active Japanese foreign 
policy, which gives priority to security issues by preferring non-military agenda. This 
new strategic vision appears as the natural result of the country’s post-war historical 
path, in its evolution from a reactive to a pro-active security actor, as well as in its 
distinctive aptitude towards the pacifism and the multilateral politics.
45
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6. Concluding remarks  
 
In the post-Cold War world scenario, the multilateralism remains the cornerstone of 
Japanese diplomacy even if, given the specific of the Japanese case and of the Asian 
model, in a more general perspective, it would be preferable to refer to the explanation 
of multilateralism suggested by scholars such as Katzenstein.
46
 They moved away from 
the classic definitions, stating that, within the Asian context, the ‘central link’ does not 
stem from multilateral formal structures, but from informal economic, cultural and 
political networks. As observed by Green, it behaves like a jewel beetle or – in Japanese 
– as tamamushi: an insect that changes colours depending on the angle from which you 
look at it.
47
 Multilateralism denotes potentialities varying within the different units in 
which the Japanese foreign policy community is articulated. According to Green, 
multilateralism in Japan “remains so popular” for various reasons.48 As is quite clear, 
one of the most urgent explanations is historical and lies in the need for Japan to be 
reintegrated into the community of nations. The road to militarism and Japan’s defeat in 
World War II began with the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the rejection 
of multilateralism in the 1930s. Japan’s promotion and participation to the world’s 
multilateral institutions is also an attempt of the country to come to terms with its own 
past. This is, at the same time, one of the reasons inducing Tokyo to reaffirm the 
alliance with Washington. In Franco Mazzei’s words, «Japan oppressed by the “weight 
of history” and having not yet developed a regional strategic vision – that is crucial if 
we take into account the many sources of conflict that remain in the region (territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea, the agonizing question of North Korea, the Taiwan 
issue) – still needs the U.S. military presence in East Asia. On the other hand, to retain 
the supremacy (or the primacy) in front of the growing power of the PRC, the U.S. 
cannot do without the alliance with Japan, which is a stronghold on the eastern outskirts 
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of Eurasia».
49
 Connected with this, although seemingly paradoxical, is the need to 
assert a diplomatic identity independent from Washington.
50
 In this sense, 
multilateralism is interpreted as an escape from a security policy markedly in line with 
the U.S. foreign politics agenda.
51
  
     In the aftermath of 9/11, international terrorism has come to prominence as one of 
the main global issues, and the control of this phenomenon held a central importance in 
the foreign aid policies of all donor countries. The ODA Taikō placed the fight against 
terrorism as one of the main problems related to stability and development of the 
international community. Along the same lines, the Charter enshrines Japan’s 
commitment in favor of poverty reduction as a «key development goal shared by the 
international community, [which is] also essential for eliminating terrorism and other 
causes of instability in the world». This is, moreover, consistent with the Millennium 
Development Goals, approved by the UN General Assembly in 2000 through the 
Millennium Declaration. Between the geographic destination of Japanese aid, Asia 
remained the priority region because it has «a greater impact on the stability and 
prosperity of Japan». In 2002 about 74% of bilateral ODA was disbursed to the 
neighboring countries, as the top ten recipients of Japanese ODA in 2001-2002 were 
China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and Brazil.  
     The priorities on which Japanese ODA recipients are selected appear, on the other 
hand, constantly changing. The Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, in recent years 
became top priorities. It should also be highlighted that the phenomenon of enjo tsukare 
mainly affected Japan’s aid flows directed to China (which has long been among its 
major recipients), something that resulted in a growing opposition on the part of 
Japanese public opinion. While Japan experienced a long period of economic 
depression, it continued to provide assistance to China which has, in the meanwhile, 
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increased its defense expenditures. The Japanese have therefore asked a reconsideration 
of ODA commitments to China, partly because of the phenomenal growth of its 
economy, but also due to the clutches of Japan’s maritime interests, and to the fact that 
China had itself become a donor country. 
     After attending the International Conference of Asian Political Parties in Southwest 
China’s Kunming City on 17 July 2010, Japan hinted quite clearly that it is now taking 
into consideration a gradual disengagement in ODA politics. Such an announcement 
acquires a specific value given the particular international situation marked by the 
American economic decline and the concurrent increasing China’s presence in Africa as 
aid donor country. In those terms, it might be argued that we are living in a moment in 
history when the well-known “Washington consensus” seems to be replacing the so-
called “Beijing Consensus”. Moreover, having overtaken Japan as the world’s second 
largest economy, it would seem paradoxical that Japan will continue to provide aid to 
China, whose rising military power, among other, cannot remain indifferent to Tokyo.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
